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THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE NEXT 200 YEARS
GEOFFREY R. STONE*

In addressing the future of the Bill of Rights, I would like to begin
with some observations about the doctrine of original intent. I do so for
two reasons. First, a great deal of attention has been paid this doctrine in
recent years, and I would like to explain why, in my view, it is a bankrupt theory of constitutional interpretation. Second, as will become clear
later, our stance towards the doctrine of original intent will have much to
do with the meaning of the Bill of Rights in the future.
We live in an era during which high officials of the United States Government have strongly endorsed the theory of original intent. The proponents of this doctrine maintain that the United States Supreme Court
should limit itself to enforcing the "original intentions" of the framers of
the United States Constitution. They claim that in much of its constitutional jurisprudence the Court has exceeded the appropriate bounds of its
authority and has substituted its own conception of what the Constitution should mean for the framers' conception of what the Constitution
does mean. The proponents of original intent assert that such "judicial
activism" pervades constitutional law and violates the essential tenets of
majority rule and democratic theory.
* Harry Kalven, Jr. Professor of Law and Dean, University of Chicago Law School. This
Article was initially delivered as the Jerome W. Sidel Memorial Lecture, which is sponsored by the
American Jewish Congress, the Washington University School of Law, and other organizations, on
September 15, 1991.
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Understanding the debate over original intent requires that we go back
to basics. What is the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional
system? What is the role of the Bill of Rights? Why do we grant the
Supreme Court the power of judicial review?
The framers of the United States Constitution confronted a difficult
task. On the one hand, they sought to establish a democratic society in
which government would act in response to the will of the majority. But
the framers also knew that there are dangers as well as strengths in
majoritarian rule. Individuals, they knew, often act out of self interest
rather than out of a more general conception of the public good. And
they knew that, human nature being what it is, majorities often would act
out of feelings of intolerance, anger, short sightedness, panic, greed, and
fear in ways that would not serve the public good and that often would
be deeply regretted when viewed from the perspective of clear-eyed, objective hindsight.
To protect against these concerns and to preserve the benefits of democratic government, the framers adopted two institutional arrangements
to brake the effects of such distortions of the majoritarian process. First,
by adopting a system of checks and balances, staggered terms of office,
separate houses of Congress, and the legislative-executive distinction, the
framers devised a set of procedures to disperse power and reduce the
potential that considerations of intolerance, greed, self-interest, faction,
and short sightedness would dominate and distort the law-making
process.
Second, the framers adopted, in the Constitution itself and in the Bill
of Rights in particular, explicit guarantees of right designed to limit the
legitimate scope of governmental power. These rights are, of course, familiar: the freedom of religion, the freedom of speech, the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to due process of law, the
privilege against compelled self incrimination, the right to counsel in
criminal cases, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments,
and so on.
Why did the framers select these rights in particular for express guarantee in the Constitution? These rights have two essential features in
common. First, they may be seen as central to the dignity and integrity
of the individual in a self-governing society. Citizens in a system of self
governance constantly must understand that they are not in a
subordinate position to government, but that government is instead
subordinate to them. By recognizing certain rights that protect from
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governmental intrusion into areas of life central to the autonomy and
dignity of the individual, the Bill of Rights reinforces the appropriate
relation between citizen and government in a self-governing society. Second, the framers knew well that these rights historically had been subject
to abuse and that, because of their very nature, they are the rights that an
intolerant or frightened majority most likely would sacrifice. It was
therefore these rights in particular that required explicit protection
against majoritarian abuse.
But what good is all this? If the majority is inclined to sacrifice these
rights, what purpose does writing them into the Constitution serve? If
they are to serve merely a hortatory purpose, then they surely will be
overridden by precisely those factors that ordinarily tend to distort the
democratic process. Here judicial review enters the picture. The Constitution provides life tenure for federal judges. We do not elect them, and
they are not dependent on the majority for their continued tenure in office. This is a central fact of our constitutional structure. Indeed, in my
view, it may well be the most central fact of our constitutional structure,
for by divorcing judges from direct responsibility to the majority and
granting them the power of judicial review, the framers created an institution designed to put a check on the democratic process. They established an institution that could, more dispassionately and with a greater
sense of history and commitment to principle, enforce the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights largely free from the considerations that often would
lead to abuse and distortion of the majoritarian process. And by measuring government action against the fundamental guarantees of the Constitution, and exercising the power to invalidate government action that
violates those guarantees, the Supreme Court effectively could police
majoritarian abuse and ensure respect for the rights and liberties of the
people.
Now, the proponents of the doctrine of original intent would, I expect,
agree with much of what I have said to this point. They challenge, not
the theory or power of judicial review as such, but the way in which the
Supreme Court has exercised it. In their view, the Court should limit
itself to the original intentions of the framers and invalidate only those
laws that the framers themselves believed violated the Constitution. Beyond that, say the proponents of original intent, the Justices simply make
up the Constitution on their own, and no one authorized them to do that.
In my view, this conception of original intent is both unwise and dangerous. I offer three reasons for this conclusion. First, this doctrine re-
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flects an illogical and unduly rigid view of interpretation. It is
incompatible with the basic tenets of legal analysis and with the essential
premises of analogical reasoning. Let me offer two simple illustrations.
First, consider the issue of wiretapping. The Fourth Amendment provides that the right of the people to be secure in their houses, persons,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated. Is a wiretap of a telephone conversation a "search" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment? It might seem evident that it is,
but for the proponents of original intent, the opposite result must prevail.
The framers, of course, did not intend the Fourth Amendment to restrict
the practice of wiretapping. They knew nothing at all of wiretapping, or
telephones, or even of electricity, and they therefore could not have had
any intent with respect to this issue one way or the other. The framers of
the Fourth Amendment had no original intent to restrict wiretapping.
Of course, the framers knew about the practice of mail opening, and they
certainly regarded mail opening as a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. And it would seem sensible to reason that if a mail
opening is a "search," then a wiretapping is a "search" as well. After all,
they both invade privacy in much the same way. Nonetheless, the proponents of original intent reject precisely this sort of analogical reasoning.
If the framers did not affrmatively intend to restrict wiretapping, it is not
for the Court to bring the Fourth Amendment up to date. The appropriate response to the gap is not interpretation, but constitutional amendment. Lest you think that I over simplify, I should point out that the
Supreme Court once held, over the dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, that a wiretap was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, for reasons quite similar to those underlying the doctrine of
original intent.' Moreover, this remained the law for some forty years,
until it was finally reversed by the Warren Court in 1967.2
For another example of this phenomenon, consider movies, television,
and radio. These means of communication did not exist when the framers enacted the First Amendment, which guarantees the freedom of
speech and of the press. The framers therefore did not intend the freedom of speech or of the press to govern these new media. They did, of
course, intend the First Amendment to cover newspapers and leafleting,
for these means of communication were well known to them. And
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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although any sensible form of reasoning by analogy would compel the
conclusion that movies, television, and radio also should be within the
protection of the First Amendment, this step involves a leap of logic that
reaches beyond the bounds of original intent. Moreover, again to dispel
any concern that I am playing fast and loose with my examples, you
should know that the courts initially held that movies were not within
the protection of the First Amendment, and that the Supreme Court to
this day accords the broadcast media a lower degree of protection under
the First Amendment than more traditional means of written
communication.
Thus, my first objection to the doctrine of original intent is that it leads
to illogical and unduly rigid results that are incompatible with any meaningful form of analogical reasoning, a process of interpretation deeply
embedded in our legal culture.
My second objection to the theory of original intent focuses on the
difficulty of ascertaining the actual intent of the framers themselves with
respect to virtually any issue of constitutional significance. To dramatize
the point, suppose that we are the members of Congress who have proposed for ratification to the states the Equal Rights Amendment, which
prohibits any state to deny any person the equal protection of the laws on
account of sex. Let us also suppose that at some point down the road the
Court is called upon to decide whether this guarantee prohibits the existence of separate men's and women's bathrooms in public buildings or the
exclusion of women from combat or the exemption of women from the
draft.
How would that future Court ascertain our intentions with respect to
those questions? The language of the Equal Rights Amendment itself
would of course provide no answer, for the language is vague in the extreme, as is the language of virtually every provision of the Constitution
that guarantees individual liberties. Presumably, the Court, attempting
to implement the theory of original intent, would look to our subjective
intent. But how would that intent have been manifested? It is, of course,
possible that some members of this body would have stated their views
on one or another of those issues, but it is unlikely that we would have
reached any explicit agreement with respect to those specific questions.
Indeed, one of the reasons we would have drafted the constitutional provision so broadly would be precisely to avoid the need to reach agreement on all of the many specific implications the provision might have.
Without such fudging, enactment of the provision might well prove im-
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possible. Moreover, even if the Court believed it could ascertain the collective intent of this body, there still would remain the question of the
intent of each of the state conventions or state legislatures that ratified
the provision.
In effect, then, any inquiry into the actual subjective intent of the framers with respect to virtually any important question of constitutional interpretation will produce no clear answer. What it will produce is very
bad history. Indeed, what almost invariably will happen is that the Justice attempting to ascertain the intent of the framers will simply attribute
to the framers his or her own preferences. How do I know what the
framers of the United States Constitution intended? Simple. I merely
ask myself what I would have intended had I been a framer, and there it
is. In that way, the proponents of original intent succeed in smuggling
their own constitutional preferences into constitutional interpretation
through the back door. If any clear example of this is needed, it is in the
twin conclusions that advocates of original intent generally reach with
respect to the Equal Protection Clause. On the one hand, the proponents
of original intent maintain that the Equal Protection Clause does not
protect women, because the framers of the clause did not explicitly intend to bring women within the protection of the clause. Fair enough.
But on the other hand, the proponents of original intent also put forth
the view that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits affirmative action in
favor of minorities. They cannot have it both ways. It is just as true that
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to prohibit
affirmative action as it is that they did not intend to prohibit discrimination against women. What we see here, as in so many other examples of
the purported use of original intent, is the attribution of the "originalists'" own views to the framers themselves.
My third objection to the doctrine of original intent is that it profoundly misunderstands the original intent of the framers themselves. To
illustrate the point, let us again suppose that we have voted to enact the
Equal Rights Amendment. And let us suppose further that we have explicitly addressed such issues as whether the Equal Rights Amendment
should prohibit separate men's and women's bathrooms in public buildings, or should prohibit the exclusion of women from combat, or should
prohibit the exemption of. women from the draft, and that we have
reached some clear, general consensus on those issues. Suppose I then
asked you, however, whether the conclusions you reached with respect to
those issues should control the meaning of the Equal Rights Amend-
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ment, not in the year 1992 or 1997, but in the year 2041, or 2091, or even
2191.
I am confident that, as thoughtful, sensible individuals, you would respond that whatever intent you might have with respect to the resolution
of those issues in the near future, you would not want to control strictly
the meaning of the Equal Rights Amendment with respect to such issues
50 or 100 or 200 years from now. You would say: "How can we possibly know what the Equal Rights Amendment should mean with respect
to those questions in a world that we cannot even begin to imagine?"
And if I asked you what relevance you would want the Equal Rights
Amendment to have to the resolution of those questions in 2041 or 2141,
you would state that you want the Amendment to be viewed as an aspiration, as a principle, as a value. You would say that you want its meaning
to evolve and shift with changes in society that you know you today
cannot foresee. In short, you would want, as a matter of your own original intent, a relatively open-textured interpretation, not the sort of crabbed construction those who espouse the doctrine of original intent put
forth. The framers, of course, as similarly thoughtful and sensible individuals, fully understood this problem. They too did not intend their
immediate expectations of the effects of the provisions they were adding
to the Constitution to control into the indefinite future. Their decision to
employ vague and open-ended language testifies to their understanding
that the meaning of those provisions would necessarily evolve if they
were to retain their vitality and relevance in an ever-changing society.
As Alexander Hamilton observed, "Constitutions should consist only of
general provisions; the reason is that they must necessarily be permanent,
and that they cannot calculate for the possible change of things."
My point is not that constitutional interpretation should be unleashed
from the core intentions and understandings of the framers. It is, rather,
that those core intentions provide only a starting point for analysis. Such
an approach, which grants considerable responsibility to the Court to
employ analogical reasoning to make constitutional provisions effective
and meaningful in an ever-evolving society, will not always produce
"right" constitutional conclusions. Once freed from the narrow constraints of a rigid and artificial originalism, constitutional interpretation
must involve a process of judgment. There will be unwise as well as wise
exercises of this judgment. But no institution of government is always
"right." The Supreme Court, of course, must be especially careful in the
exercise of the power of judicial review, for when it invokes that power it
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acts in a nondemocratic fashion. But the power of judicial review, and
the responsibility aggressively to enforce the rights and liberties enshrined in the Constitution, provide essential checks on the majoritarian
process. The framers intentionally built these checks into the central
fabric of our constitutional structure, and an abdication of this responsibility would, in my view, be as bad, or worse, than its occasional overuse.
Perhaps the best test of any institution of government is whether it has
made this a better, more decent, and more civilized society. If for the
past forty years we had had Justices who subscribed to the theory of
original intent, we still would have state-sanctioned prayer; state-mandated racial segregation in our schools; no constitutional protection of
equality for women; no constitutional protection against even gross malapportionment of our legislatures; no disclosure of the Pentagon Papers
during the Vietnam War; no federal constitutional protection of freedom
of speech, freedom of press, freedom of religion, or other fundamental
rights against state infringement; no effective restraint against government abuse in the interrogation process; no effective protection against
government lawlessness in search and seizure; and no effective right to
counsel for persons accused of crime. If I am right that the ultimate
question in evaluating an institution of government is whether it has
made this a better or worse society, then for me the answer is clear: the
judicial activism of the past that the proponents of original intent have
subjected to such abuse in recent years has, on balance, made this a more
sane, a more decent, and a more civilized society.
Now, what does all this have to do with Bill of Rights in the next 200
years? Well, if we embraced a rigid doctrine of original intent as the core
of our constitutional interpretation, the meaning of the Bill of Rights in
2191 would look very much as it would in 2091, or 1991, or 1891, or
1791. That is, in the absence of amendments to the Constitution itself,
the Bill of Rights would prohibit essentially the same practices in 2191
that it prohibited in 1791, and little, if anything, else. The enormous
changes in society, culture, and technology in the interim would be of no
constitutional consequence. Constitutional interpretation would be
static, and I surely would not have been invited to offer my thoughts on
this subject.
Fortunately, that is not the case. Original intent is not and never has
been the predominant mode of constitutional interpretation. We have a
dynamic, not an ossified Constitution. This is not, however, all good
news. For the corollary is that, once freed from the constraints of origi-
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nal intent, it becomes largely impossible to predict what constitutional
interpretation of the Bill of Rights will look like as we move into an
always changing and uncertain future. Freed from the binds of original
intent, it is no more meaningful for me to attempt to predict the meaning
of the free speech guarantee in the year 2191 than it would be for you, as
framers of the Equal Rights Amendment, to attempt to control the
meaning of that guarantee 200 years from now.
In short, and in all candor, I have little, if anything, useful to tell you
about what the Bill of Rights will mean in the next 200 years. Consider,
for example, a similar conference in 1891 designed to forecast the interpretation of the Bill of Rights in the next century. If we were today to
review the predictions proffered at that conference, I am certain we
would find that the prognosticators of the time failed dismally. Indeed,
one prediction I will make today, though I am not sure hindsight qualifies as prediction, is that, unlike the present, in which we are inundated
with celebrations of the Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights, few, if any,
conferences, panel discussions, debates, or symposia were held 100 years
ago to mark the Centennial of the Bill of Rights.
This, in itself, is significant. The plain fact is that in 1891 the Bill of
Rights really did not seem all that important. This was so because the
single most important development in the history of the Bill of Rights,
and in the importance of the Bill of Rights to our Nation, occurred after
1891, was largely unanticipated in 1891, and did not even involve an
interpretation of the Bill of Rights itself.
This development was the doctrine of incorporation, which did not
emerge in full form until the 1930s. Let me take a moment to explain.
The Constitution is a charter of government. The rights set forth in that
document are not rights in the general sense. They are, rather, limitations on government. Thus, try as hard as I might, I cannot violate your
right to free speech, or freedom of religion, or your freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. I may impair your ability to speak freely,
for example, by assaulting you for advocating communism, but this
would not violate your constitutional right to freedom of speech. Only
the government can do that.
Similarly, the Constitution of the United States and its Bill of Rights
originally were designed and understood as limiting only the national
government. Thus, your "right" to freedom of speech guaranteed by the
First Amendment limited the federal government, but not the State of
Missouri or the City of St. Louis. The State and the City, like private
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individuals, were legally incapable of violating the Bill of Rights, for
those rights were designed to limit only the government of the United
States.
After the Civil War, however, the Nation adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment. Through a process of constitutional interpretation that
evolved over many decades, the Supreme Court gradually held that that
Amendment, which prohibited any state from denying any person "due
process of law," "incorporated" within its protections most of the rights
guaranteed in the original Bill of Rights against the national government.
As a consequence of the doctrine of incorporation, the United States
Constitution now prohibits the State of Missouri and the City of St.
Louis, like the government of the United States, from denying your freedom of speech, your freedom of religion, and your freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
This doctrine has had an enormous effect on the importance of the Bill
of Rights and of the Supreme Court, for it brought to the Court's attention a broad range of laws and governmental practices that previously
would not have been within the purview of the Constitution, and because
it established a nation wide, uniform protection for our most fundamental rights and liberties against all governmental interference. As a practical matter, the Bill of Rights we celebrate today is as much the product
of the doctrine of incorporation as it is of the drafters of the first eight
amendments themselves. Thus, even if a conference on the Centennial of
the Bill of Rights had been held in 1891, the speakers would not have
had any idea of the extraordinary developments to come. Incorporation
was the key.
The prediction problem goes even further, however, for even if a
Centennial Conference had been held in 1891, and even if some speaker
had presciently predicted incorporation, it is doubtful that the participants would have anticipated the other critical developments of the next
100 years. The Supreme Court of 1891 was notoriously conservative.
Indeed, that Court only a few years later held in Plessy v. Ferguson 3 that
racial segregation was constitutional so long as it met the principle of
"separate but equal," and that Court only a few years later laid the
groundwork for the doctrine of economic substantive due process, which
invalidated a broad range of reform legislation designed to protect consumers and workers from the abuses of an unregulated market.
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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It was through the filter of such experience that the participants in our
hypothetical 1891 Conference would have looked forward, and through
that filter, the speakers could not possibly have foreseen that the
Supreme Court of the future would outlaw school prayer, require the
police to give Miranda' warnings, protect the right to advocate violent
overthrow of the government, or recognize a constitutional right to abortion. No one in 1891 would have predicted all, or any, of that.
Why is prediction so difficult? After all, even if we reject the static
concept of original intent, constitutional interpretation is "law," and
"law" should have some element of constancy, certainty, and predictability. What, then, is the problem?
The problem is time. In fact, law, even constitutional law, is generally
quite constant, certain, and predictable-if we look at it in relatively
short time-bites. But over decades, to say nothing of centuries, law, and
especially constitutional law, is unpredictable in the extreme. This is so
for several reasons. But before I turn to those reasons, I would like to
say just a word about why, over the short run, constitutional law is law
and not "politics," why it should not be understood as the product of
mere judicial whim, preference, or partisan ideology.
Like all judge-made law, the doctrine of precedent governs constitutional law. Judges, even Justices of the Supreme Court, are steeped in
our tradition of stare decisis. They do not see themselves as free to reexamine every issue every time it arises. Even our most radical Justices,
of the left or the right, have felt themselves constrained by the body of
law with which they must work. They are not free simply to jettison the
past and call a "do over." Each decision must build upon, address, and
confront the past. The process is cautious, incremental, and tentative. It
is remarkably patient.
Here is an image for you to consider. Imagine an enormous gelatinous
mass large enough to fill a football field. The mass moves slowly forward. Now imagine nine individuals in black robes, each carrying a
bucket. They are at the front of the mass, and it dwarfs them. As the
mass oozes forward, these individuals use their buckets to try to direct its
flow. Sometimes they all, or most of them, try to move the mass in the
same direction. More often, they all, or most of them, try to move the
mass in different directions. Sometimes they can shepherd the mass, but
it is slow going and it takes time.
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The mass, of course, is the body of law with which the Justices must
work. It has a powerful effect on what they can do, but changes of direction-usually small, occasionally large-are possible, particularly if the
Justices have a common vision and lots of time in which to do their
work. It is the mass that makes law, especially in the short run,
predictable.
What, then, makes constitutional law so unpredictable in the long run?
Put differently, what determines the direction the mass will take? There
are several factors. First and most obviously, there is the nature, background, and ideology of the Justices themselves. Different individuals
bring to the Court different values, experiences, and visions of the role
and responsibility of the Court in our constitutional system. Those values, experiences, and visions profoundly affect the way in which they
approach-and decide-constitutional questions. William Rehnquist
has a vastly different vision of constitutional law than Thurgood Marshall. A Court of nine Rehnquists will move the mass much differently
than would a Court of nine Marshalls. This is neither a bad thing nor a
good thing. It merely is. Justices, like all of us, are human. They see the
world-including the legal world-through their own eyes. Law, and
especially constitutional law, cannot be divorced from these differing perspectives. Law, and especially constitutional law, is not bloodless, formulaic, or mechanical. We should not pretend that it is. Constitutional
law is unpredictable over the long run, not because individual Justices
have differing views and perspectives as such, but because Justices are
appointed by Presidents who do not make random choices and whose
elections over the long run are impossible to predict. Who would have
guessed in 1964, for example, when it looked as if we had seen the demise
of the Republican Party, that Republicans would win six of the next
seven Presidential elections? In 1964, we would have confidently predicted that Democrats would dominate the next quarter century and that
the Warren Court, in spirit if not in person, would still be firmly entrenched today. Of course, as we now know, we could not have been
more wrong.
Second, constitutional law is the product, not only of partisan presidential politics, but also of long-term social, economic, cultural, and
political change in the Nation. The Depression of the 1930s produced an
extraordinary centralization of authority in the national government to
address a national problem. This mind set-looking towards a uniform,
federal law-contributed significantly to the development of the incorpo-
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ration doctrine, which produced a similar, uniform constitutional law at
the federal level with respect to individual rights. Similarly, the movement of blacks to the North, the process of urbanization, and the civil
rights movement together created the conditions that led to the criminal
procedure revolution of the 1960s, in which the Court adopted the exclusionary rule, required Miranda warnings, and expanded the right to
counsel in criminal prosecutions, all of which were designed to address
evils that nonlegal social and economic change had produced.
Third, constitutional law is the product of technological change, much
of which is difficult, if not impossible, to predict. The advent of electronic bugging devices and parabolic microphones posed new and difficult issues for the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. What is a
"search"? What is a "seizure"? Similarly, the development of new
means of communication has had profound effects on society in general
and on the political process in particular-effects that have generated
complex efforts to regulate the media and the political process in ways
that could not have been foreseen in 1891.
Finally, constitutional law is the product of changes in world politics
and economics. Developments in the Soviet Union led to the era of McCarthyism and the extraordinary strains that era placed on the First
Amendment; developments in Nazi Germany had an important effect on
American constitutional law, including the recognition in the 1940s of a
constitutional right not to be sterilized, a decision that was a precursor of
Roe v. Wade;' and the Vietnam War produced the Pentagon Papers decision,6 which significantly strengthened our commitment to freedom of
political expression.
What, then, of the next 200 years? Your guess, frankly, is as good as
mine. Who will win the next ten elections-the Democrats or the
Republicans? Will there even be Democrats in 2041? What will happen
socially, economically, and culturally in the United States over the next
200 years? Will crime fulfill our worst nightmares? What will happen to
the urban underclass? Will we suffer a depression, or two, or five? Will
the population explode, or dwindle? What will we do with issues of gun
control, sexual orientation, the changing concept of the family, and, perhaps, compulsory sterilization? What of technological change? What
will happen with genetic engineering? With our ability to prolong life?
5, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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With the increasing concentration of media and efforts to regulate the
political process? With the ever-expanding capacity of government to
gather, store, and process all sorts of information about our private lives?
More speculatively, perhaps in 100 or 200 years we will have interplanetary or even interstellar travel. What, then, of the right to travel? We
even may be forced to confront the awkward reality of extra-planetary
aliens. Is a Uranian a "person" within the meaning of the Constitution?
And what of world change? Will we, in 2091, merge with Canada? With
the European Community? With the Commonwealth of Independent
States? What will that do to our Bill of Rights? And what of the effects
of religious fundamentalism? Will that movement take hold in the
United States? Next year? In 2041? 2091? 2191? Can we even begin to
guess at the answers to such questions?
Where, then, does this leave us? Certainly, I can offer some predictions and, not to disappoint you completely, I will. I can, for example,
predict some of what will happen in the next decade. Given the current
make-up of the Supreme Court, and its likely make-up into the next century, I predict the following concerning the Bill of Rights: Roe v. Wade 7
will be overruled. The Court will severely limit the protection of sexually
oriented speech under the First Amendment. The Court will expand significantly the power of government to condition the receipt of government funding and other privileges on the waiver of constitutional rights.
This shift, presaged by last year's decision on abortion counselling,8 will
vastly enlarge the power of government indirectly to suppress the exercise of constitutional rights. The protection accorded religious freedom
will be sharply curtailed. In the area of free exercise, the Court already
has taken an important step in this direction in its decision two years ago
denying the right of Native Americans to use peyote in their religious
services.9 In the area of establishment, we can expect a similar reorientation, perhaps as early as this year. Within a very short time, it will again
be constitutional for public schools to display a creche on school
grounds. The protections accorded those suspected of crime, reflected in
such decisions as Miranda v. Arizona,"° Mapp v. Ohio, and other cases
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See supra note 6.
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See supra note 4.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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guaranteeing procedural fairness, will be significantly eviscerated in the
years to come. The exclusionary rule, in particular, will meet its demise.
We might think of all this in terms of the mass. From 1954, when the
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education,12 until 1968, when the Warren Court drew to a close, the mass flowed in a very definite direction.
The Court in this era used its energy, its resources, and its moral authority aggressively to interpret the Constitution in general and the Bill of
Rights in particular to protect the fundamental rights of the Court's natural and intended constituency-the underrepresented, the despised, and
the oppressed-those groups and individuals-Communists, Blacks, Jehovah's Witnesses, and members of other political, racial, religious, and
ethnic minorities-whose interests were persistently unprotected in the
majoritarian political process. In so doing, the Court, in my view, performed its intended function in the best and most responsible manner.
From 1968 to about 1988, the Court stopped the movement of the
mass. With but a few exceptions, prior developments in the protection of
individual liberties were brought to a halt, though they were only occasionally directly reversed.
We are now in an era in which the mass is flowing back on itself, in
new swirls and patterns that protect states' rights and federalism, the
democratic principle, and executive authority. The rights of the unrepresented, the oppressed, and the disadvantaged are a nuisance, rather than
a mission. In the coming years, the Bill of Rights will be in remission.
The Court increasingly will focus on issues of federalism and separation
of powers, and potential civil rights litigants will grow ever more reluctant to bring their causes to the Court. We will, in an important sense,
be a nation without a Supreme Court in terms of its most important function. This is, in my view, a severe failure of our constitutional system.
How did this happen? Is it our fault, if fault it be? If, as I suggest, we
cannot predict the future, can we at least control it? We cannot control
most of the forces I identified earlier that shape the evolution of constitutional law. Social, economic, cultural, political, and technological
changes provide the backdrop against which the Court operates. They
are, for these purposes, a given.
We do, however, have some control over what in the end is the most
important factor-the character, the ability, and the vision of our Justices. It is, in the end, the individuals who wield the judicial power of the
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Supreme Court of the United States who must face the challenges of the
future, and the best way to face those challenges well is to appoint the
right men and women to the task.
This is both easier and more complex than it sounds. On the one
hand, it is unlikely in the extreme that a political majority will elect a
President on a platform that calls explicitly for the appointment of Justices who will aggressively construe the Constitution to protect the rights
and interests of racial, religious, and other minorities. The Court, at its
best, is counter majoritarian. That is the deepest irony of our constitutional structure, and political majorities rarely will be galvanized to elect
a President so that he or she can restrict the majority's own power. It is
thus not surprising that appeals to the electorate concerning the Court
are most successful when they appeal to those who believe that "the
Court has gone too far."
We do, however, have every right to expect that our Presidents will
appoint only truly distinguished individuals to the Court; that in making
their nominations our Presidents will take into account not only partisan
political advantage, but also the special and unique role the Court plays
in our complex constitutional system; and that our Senate will confirm
only those nominees who meet the highest standards of excellence and
whose appointment will serve the best interests of the Nation.
In this, our Presidents in the last quarter-century have let us down, for
they too often have placed partisan political advantage over their responsibility to preserve and protect the essential role of the Court, and our
Senate has let us down because of its failure to assert its authority and its
constitutional prerogative to insist on nominees who serve what they,
too, believe to be the best interests of the Nation.
According to popular myth, the Senate must exercise its advise and
consent power to confirm a Presidential nominee unless the Senate finds
that the nominee is intellectually unqualified or lacking in character.
This seriously misconceives fhe appropriate role of the Senate and confuses the Senate's role in considering a Presidential nominee for the position of Attorney General or Secretary of State with its role in considering
a Presidential nominee for appointment to the Supreme Court of the
United States. In the former situation, it is appropriate for the Senate to
defer to Presidential prerogative, because the Attorney General or Secretary of State is a personal adviser to the President whose term of office
ends with the term of the President. A Justice of the Supreme Court,
however, is not a personal adviser to the President, but the holder of one
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ninth of the power of the third branch of government, and a Justice's
tenure is, of course, for life.
No reason in political theory, national tradition, constitutional history,
or common sense exists for the prevailing myth that the Senate must
defer. Indeed, as originally drafted, the Constitution assigned the power
to appoint Justices to the Senate. The power to nominate was reassigned
to the President on virtually the last day of the Constitutional Convention when it occurred to one of the framers that multi-member bodies are
not very good at making appointments. The decision to give the President the power of nomination was thus in no sense intended to give the
president the final say. 3
Of course, throughout most of our history, the Senate has deferred.
But this is so because, through most of our history, the Presidency and
the Senate have, at any point in time, been controlled by the same political party. In such circumstances, one would of course expect the Senate
to defer. But when the Senate and the Presidency have been in different
political hands, the Senate frequently has denied confirmation.
The awkwardness of the current state of affairs is evident in the fact
Republicans have controlled the Presidency for nineteen of the past
twenty-three years, while Democrats have controlled the Senate for
twenty-one of those years. There has been no national consensus in favor
of one party or the other. Yet in those twenty-three years, we have had
ten consecutive Republican appointments of conservative-often extremely conservative-Justices.
This might be acceptable if there were, in fact, a true national consensus reflected in one party's dominance of the national government. But
in an era of divided government, the Senate's failure to exercise its constitutional authority and responsibility-in the face of highly ideological
Presidential nominations-has produced a serious constitutional failure.
It is a failure that we, and our children, and perhaps even our children's
children will have to live with well into the twenty-first century.

13. See David Strauss & Cass Sunstein, The Need for Senate Independence in the Confirmation
Process, 101 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1992); James E. Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the
Senate in Supreme Court Appointments, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 337 (1989).

